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W e live in an increasingly wicked world, both in the common understanding of the word (given the growing number of serious security bushfires around the world threatening to join into a larger forest conflagration) and from a systems engineering perspective;1 where interrelationships between concurrent and coincident actors and events necessitate increasingly complex solutions, to even the most seemingly simple crisis, if unintended consequences are not to dominate outcomes. The European Union (EU) has responded to such increasing complexity in its approach to delivering Comprehensive action and effects – it now assumes modern crises require all instruments of power to be woven together from the outset to address them – a full span of such levers are, of course, the constituent parts of the EU. Some organizations might say they already deliver comprehensive effect. However the EU’s uniqueness lies in that it does not presume a starting point where any one lever of power is dominant–as is found in a defense dominated organization such as NATO. The EU’s model roughly equates to the U.S. interagency, but working in this case not under just one administration but 28! Novel, and beginning to show real promise of delivering more enduring outcomes, this approach requires an attitude of mind in the military in the EU that has to learn to cope with ambiguity and compromise. They must also cope with the fact that defense isn’t the dominant partner in an environment that, from its outset, has always been orientated more towards the norms of society and nation building than crisis management. Albeit, of late with the advent of the 2009 EU Lisbon Treaty, Member States (MS) have indicated their intent to grow the ability to deliver more coherent external action in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management through the formation of the European External Action Service on 1 January 2011, which has incorporated, inter alia, the European Union Military Staff. The Issue All too frequently military interlocutors outside the European Union (EU) get frustrated that “we” Rear Admiral (UKRN) Bruce Williams is Deputy Director General of the European Union Military Staff.48 | FeAtures PrisM 4, No. 3 Williams don’t act or feel like NATO. What follows attempts to address that frustration and suggest that the unique complexities of the EU are both desirable and increasingly proving to be an advantage in some circumstances. Such a discourse will also examine how the EU integrates military effect into its external action and show why the EU does not duplicate NATO, why it has a different philosophy of working, why (at times) it has entirely different roles and why such difference may eventually be seen as more complementary, and not in competition, with the efforts of other defense dominated organizations, such as NATO. The Comparator For a start the context is substantially different. The genesis of NATO, and its authority today, rests largely on the application of a single instrument of power–defense and security. Defense is the senior stakeholder with, by and large, the civil dimension being spread sparsely throughout the structure. Obvious advantages flow from this more discrete and focused lever, in terms of its ability to respond to crises at short notice. Such agility requires high readiness capabilities to support such advantage– hence, in part, the justification for permanent command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure and response forces designed to operate quickly and up to the highest reaches of the spectrum of crisis. Of course utility across the spectrum of crisis must not be confused with, or detract from, NATO’s ultimate purpose of assured collective defense and thus the drive to sustain the capabilities necessary to fulfill that remit. Such high-end capability necessarily proffers the capacity to address issues lower in spectrum and to pursue its “Comprehensive Action” ambitions. The difference between “Comprehensive Action” and the “Comprehensive Approach” might be, in the latter case, making a difference between using all possible means and valorizing them and others, in the former case, who can only coordinate. So such ambitions will always be constrained by the organization’s design; where, in essence, although “Comprehensive” expertise might be integrated (see figure 1) into the organization, “Comprehensive” partners will still have to be contracted-in on a caseby-case basis. The European Union in the World The EU on the other hand, with access to almost all levers of power, from its birth, has been Figure 1: Variation in Comprehensive Approach Integrated (NATO) Associated (EU) Integral Comprehensiveness Contracted-in Comprehensiveness Comprehensive Approach Experts MilitaryPrisM 4, No. 3 FeAtures | 49 A EuropEAn union MilitAry point of ViEw predominantly concerned with the norms of human existence and nation building, rather than crises requiring military response – as an aside, one might argue this has had the effect of promoting a more impartial EU military persona in the settlement of international disputes. That said, EU Member States reinforced the possibilities of collective security and defense interests2 in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.3 In doing so, their aim was to remove legal and other institutional impediments in order to promote more coherent comprehensive EU external action. In other words it looked to a future with real opportunity, inter alia, for intelligent and more subtle application of the military instrument. Such ambition manifests itself most obviously through the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)4 on 1 January, 2011.5 The EEAS is functionally autonomous from other EU bodies but has a legal responsibility to ensure its policies are consistent with those of other EU institutions. Accordingly the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also a Vice President of the European Commission and President of the European Foreign Affairs Council with a mandate to: ■■ conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy; ■■ contribute proposals to the development of that policy and execute it under the mandate of the European Council;6 ■■ preside over the Foreign Affairs Council of Ministers;7 ■■ ensure the Vice-Presidents of the Commission8 the consistency of the Union’s external action; Figure 2: EU Comprehensive Approach Note: In rough terms, to address emergent crises or potential crises the EEAS draws together the three points of this triangle into a Crisis Platform. This Crisis Platform is not just EEAS but a range of stakeholders including, and crucially, the European Commission. Drawing from Framework Policy for the Region the Crisis Platform initiates development of the Crisis Management Concept document (the Comprehensive Estimate) for Member State’s agreement on the need for, and span of, EU involvement in a Crisis. Crisis Platform Geographic & Multilateral Directorates Commission Development Economy Trade Defence & Security Rule of Law Diplomacy Political CSDP50 | FeAtures PrisM 4, No. 3 Williams ■■ represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and express the Union’s position in international fora; ■■ exercise authority over the European External Action Service and over EU delegations in third countries and at international organizations. In practice this means the EEAS (which includes EU Delegations spread world wide) has a mandate that ranges from peace building and conflict prevention to the promotion of democracy, human rights and cooperation to provision of development aid9 to building of security through the Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP)10 – all collectively summarized at figure 2 and with arrangements for executive oversight shown at figure 3. EU Mechanisms This security and defense component, as a junior partner in a civil dominated convoluted nexus of instruments, brings with it unique advantage when it comes to crisis management–the potential to deliver effect from a truly intrinsic Comprehensive Approach.11 Of course remembering also the very real advantage of this approach is its capacity to deliver effect well before issues become a crisis through concerted effort on conflict prevention. Much of this prevention effort is the daily “bread and butter” work of the EEAS, dominated as it is by diplomatic and development capacities, that fits into what might be considered a crisis management cycle that aims to promote prevention rather than cure as the best course toward peace and prosperity. The down-side of such diversity of stakeholders, with at times conflicting mandates or motivations,12 results in an environment in which problems appear difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory or changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Indeed the effort to solve one aspect of such problems may reveal or create others.13 In this context one might consider the military in the EU being considered akin to NATO’s Political Advisers EU Strategic & Objectives (CFSP is one area amongst others) Framing of CFSP based on European Council guidelines Ensures consistent application of policies and actions Monitors the international situation in areas covered by CFSP and provides the political control and strategic direction of crisis management Advisers & Experts (including Military Representatives PSC Ambassadors Ambassadors (PERMREPS) Ministers Heads of State/Government European Council Council Political & Security Committee (PSC) Council of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) Foreign affairs committees & working groups (Thematic) Foreign affairs committees & working groups (Geographic) CSDP committees & working groups (includes EU Military Committee) Figure 3: CSDP OversightPrisM 4, No. 3 FeAtures | 51 A EuropEAn union MilitAry point of ViEw (POLADs) in relative numerical terms–in effect the Military Advisers (MILADs) to the EU. However, this is where this simile breaks down, as the EU military’s remit and expected span of influence, including creating the space in which Operation/ Mission Commanders can do their work, is substantially greater. So given the diverse and convoluted environment in which the EU military exists, it should not be a surprise that military absolutism (more prevalent in defense dominated organizations such as NATO) has to give way to greater levels of compromise, collaboration and, critically, levels of ambiguity that most Service personnel will not have experienced before. And it doesn’t stop there, as the military has also to adapt to the language of the civilian majority in order to thrive in this somewhat alien environment. Perhaps adapting to this context would be more straightforward if one was part of just one institution. However, the EU is an alliance of institutions with all the natural tensions that that context promotes. For instance one might view the relations between the EEAS and the individual Commissioners in the European Commission as one would between ministries in a government– all have their own opinion on external actions within their respective domains. But one should remember that such cultures and behaviors may, in part, be the legacy of pre-Lisbon treaty structures that show signs of fading in the face of promising Comprehensive successes such as in the Horn of Africa (HoA). That said it is important to realize that, unlike many other aspects of EU business, common security and defense policy is entirely owned by Member States. The European Commission has no formal role to play in CSDP and the European Parliament has opinions but no immediate influence on this policy14 (as discussed later in this Figure 4: EU Military Operational Chain of Command Note: The EUMS is the source of collective multidisciplinary military expertise within the EEAS; working under the direction of the EUMC and under the direct authority of the HRVP. As an integral component of the EEAS’s Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, with particular foci on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: provision of early warning (through the SIAC), situation assessment, strategic planning, CIS, concept development and support of partnerships through mil-mil relationships. Concurrently the EUMS is charged with sustaining the dormant KO OPSCEN and providing its core staff when activated. Berlin+ with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities Autonnomous Autonnomous (very small scale) EU Military Staff Chairman EU Military Committee (principal military day to day point of contact for Op Commanders) EU OPSCEN COUNCIL/PSC EU OHQ at SHAPE Designated EU OHQ Political Strategic Level Operational Level52 | FeAtures PrisM 4, No. 3 Williams article however, in seeking a truly Comprehensive Approach the opinion of the EU Commissioners and European Parliament remains of great import). Member States’ ownership of CSDP routinely manifests itself through the Member States’ Ambassadors in the Political Security Committee (PSC), supported by CSDP advisory committees and working groups (amongst which Member States’ Military Representatives (MILREPs) convene as the EU Military Committee (EUMC)).15 This is, in some ways, analogous to the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee in NATO (indeed many of the MILREPs are dual-hatted to the EU and NATO) but, again, the simile breaks down as the command process differs significantly. For instance, the first level of executive power rests with the PSC, to whom all EU Operational Commanders (civil and military) report directly–an extremely short chain of command (figure 4). The EUMC, with staff support provided largely by the EU Military Staff (EUMS), exists to provide military advice to the PSC on behalf of Member States’ Chiefs of Defense (in most instances).16 It is necessary at this point to pause for a moment and reflect on the mandate of the EUMS that itself adds to the complex (“wicked”) problem. Even though EU structures and institutions have changed substantially over the last two years, as things stand today, the EUMS hasn’t formally modified its role since its creation just over ten years ago. It still identifies and assesses crisis situations, plans, and enables and supports operations, whilst conducting long-term concept and capability development. However, within the new paradigm, as an integral part of the EEAS, the scope and complexity of the EUMS role has dramatically increased. So today, as well as providing the source of military expertise within the EU into the Comprehensive Approach, substantial EUMS effort is also spent being the essential interface between the EEAS and EUMC, and with other military partners, such as NATO,17 UN and AU. The Approach to Comprehensiveness For quite some time the phrase, “Comprehensive Approach to crisis management,” has been much used but less well understood. For the military, perhaps one can summarize the approach by simply recognizing that there are limits to what the military can achieve in crisis management–while there may be an important role for the military, it has been demonstrated repeatedly, in recent years, that the military component cannot alone normally deliver a lasting end-state. Perhaps, by way of example, the Libyan conflict ably demonstrates this point. Although a military culminating point was reached 18 months ago, it is obvious, that in January 2013 there is some way to go in helping the Libyans secure the peace. Indeed, some argue today that the apparent use of the military instrument alone has resulted in the unintended consequence of exacerbation of regional instability in the Sahel, and in Mali in particular, in addition to ongoing security concerns in Libya. This is where the EU’s unique selling point, of having most levers of power available to realize Comprehensive Action, comes into its own. Naturally it is more difficult, and time consuming, to consolidate the plethora of interests vested in the different levers. Nevertheless, the EU has that inherent depth and breadth necessary to provide coherent multidisciplinary solutions to crisis, albeit more tailored towards the lower end of the spectrum of crisis than NATO (figure 5). That said, from this greater utility at the lower end of the crisis continuum,18 one should not infer lack of capability higher up the spectrum–the EU’s formal ambition, assuming an issue directly impacts on EU political goals and interests, goes up as far as peace enforcement in regional crises. This suggests that developing NATO-EU collaboration must be a central concern of each organization’s future when it comes to defense and security (in NATO) /security and defense (in the EU). In short, the EU and NATO are naturally separated by ambition and processes, and, to Member States’ direct benefit, it would appear increasingly desirable to build PrisM 4, No. 3 FeAtures | 53 A EuropEAn union MilitAry point of ViEw on those discrete, but essentially complementary, drivers–indeed noting that any one strength might actually live in both NATO and EU simultaneously. Building the Future Part of that complementarity necessarily resides in the area of concept and capability development – clearly essential to enable the Comprehensive Approach. Thus, unsurprisingly, the EU military must also have responsibilities in developing the future–especially where such efforts assist Member States’ Defense budgets by promoting common capabilities to protect our interests. Additionally, it should also come as no surprise that, with 22 Member States common to both organizations, the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” capabilities development initiative is entirely complementary and coherent with NATO’s equivalent “Smart Defense” initiative. Within the EU, this work requires a symbiotic relationship between the EUMS and European Defense Agency (EDA) to both deliver such output and, especially in the case of EDA, to promote the preservation of the European defense industrial and technological base.19 And in doing so progress in such a way that complements, not duplicates or competes with, the efforts of NATO and other Member States’ national considerations. Accordingly EDA and EUMS facilitate Member States in improving their respective capabilities for use by NATO or EU, and not exclusively by one or the other. Figure 5: EU Military Operational Chain of Command Notes: 1. Upper level determined by NATO’s Level of Ambition. 2. Upper level determined by EU’s Headline Goals. 3. Line represents conflation of the military instrument into the civil. 4. Point at which EU’s relative utility (in general terms) might be considered to outweigh NATO’s as one moves towards peace where a wider variety of instruments of power naturally reside. 5. Military utility extends further down the spectrum by dint of integration with other instruments in the EU. Relative Utility Peace Crisis War Domestic Disaster Relief Domestic Civil Support Security Assistance Peacetime Consequence Management Counter Organized Crime Disaster Relief Hummanitarian Assistance Counter Narcotics Counter Piracy Counter Terrorisim Counter Insurgency Non-Combatant Evacuations Conflict Consequence Management Major Theatre War Strategic Level War Show of Force Sanctions Enforcement Political/Economic Sanctions Nation Assistance Peace Keeping Peace Enforcement Limited Conventional Conflict Peace Building Environmental/ Resource Protection Arms Control EU Comprehensive Action EU Civilian Instruments EU Military Instruments NATO Comprehensive Action Climate Change Note 1 Note 3 Note 5 Note 2 Note 454 | FeAtures PrisM 4, No. 3 Williams Limits to Military Reach But it must be recognized that, in Brussels, such military influence on the Comprehensive Approach is largely achieved through the efforts of just over 200 military personnel operating within an environment of 25,000 EU civilian staff (including 1,600 in the EEAS HQ). For any crisis the EEAS routinely brings together the key actors for the region in question: the EEAS Corporate Board, the regional/geographic Managing Director, the Managing Director Crisis Response, the representatives of the in-country EU Delegation, the three crisis management organizations (EUMS, Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and Civilian Planning & Conduct Capability– CPCC), the EEAS’s civil and military intelligence directorates, cross cutting issue departments for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention or Global and Multilateral Issues (such as human rights and democracy or counter terrorism) and, as importantly, the European Commission experts (predominantly from the areas of development and cooperation,20 and humanitarian aid and civil protection).21 One could also add to this mix other actors such as the 150 plus EU delegations around the world, who like the stakeholders in the Crisis Platform above, are also more and more welcoming of the military instrument in their midst – and not just in crisis but also in acknowledging that the military has a role to play in peace as well. Inevitably some will raise the concern about high bureaucratic density in having so many stakeholders engaged. And they would be right – it is difficult to work with so many actors to drive real output. No doubt over time natural selection might streamline this more. However, the essential nature of the “Comprehensive Approach” in the EU (as indicated right at the beginning of this article and at figure1) means benefit will only accrue from embracing such complexity if lasting solutions, using all the instruments of power, not temporary fixes are to be found. Empirically, as highlighted Bundeswehr/Bier european training Mission in MaliPrisM 4, No. 3 FeAtures | 55 A EuropEAn union MilitAry point of ViEw earlier in this article, an increasing body of evidence (from Iraq and Afghanistan to name but two sources) points to the probability that an overly simplistic initial approach to emergent crises only results in long-term chronic problems. That said, given the newness and uniqueness of this truly joined up approach in the EU (to establish key areas of concern, methods to address them and then conduct strategic planning to articulate to Member States how the EU might respond) one must accept this is still, albeit encouraging, work in progress. But progress nevertheless and an approach that is providing tangible results – for instance, as alluded to earlier, in the Horn of Africa. Demonstrating Potential for Success The Horn of Africa is a region that suffers from natural disasters such as drought, is struggling with a largely failed state in Somalia and has to cope with the endemic problems that these cause. We see uncontrolled migration, repressive religious fundamentalism and rampant organized crime from, broadly, an absence of the rule of law. This is clearly a complex region with severe man-made, and natural, causes of instability. So how does the EU, since the formation of the EEAS, begin to address this? Towards the end of 2011 the EEAS crafted a framework strategy for the Horn of Africa describing the EU’s interests and objectives. This strategy, owned by a new EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, is designed to act as an umbrella under which lie various lines of development and associated action plans, with the express aim of ensuring coherent collaboration of all instruments to deliver comprehensive progress towards enduring stability for the region. Lines of actions associated with the military, within that construct, are: ■■ Enhancing the Somali National Security Forces by the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), which trains Somali soldiers in the safe training environment of Uganda. This EU training is conducted with strategic partners including Uganda, African Union (AU) and the United States. This is directly contributing to establishing stability and security in Somalia. EUTM at the beginning of 2013 is stepping up a gear with a new and expanded mandate that will see such training develop more in Somalia itself and include the mentoring of Somali ministries and headquarters to improve their effectiveness and accountability; ■■ Countering piracy–the EU launched its first maritime Operation (ATALANTA) in late 2008 to guarantee the security of the World Food Program ships providing food aid to Somalia, escorting shipping from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and re-supplying their force by sea and countering the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This has directly led (in concert with efforts from partners such as NATO, Coalition Maritime Forces and other nations’ unilateral activities) to increased safety for merchant shipping transiting the Horn of Africa–the crucial artery of trade to and from Europe and the east. It is worth noting that the relative robustness and reach of this operation’s mandate, in particular, is now setting a bench mark for such operations; ■■ Supporting capacity building–the military has a supporting role in a project for Regional Maritime Capacity Building (EUCAP NESTOR), launched to develop and train regional states in maritime security, thereby developing an enduring and locally-owned capacity to tackle illicit exploitation of their maritime resources. This fits into a much broader picture with many civilian lines of action that include: ■■ Development funding utilized for creating security, building peace, and improving democratic governance in Somalia. Over €215 million had been set aside for the period 56 | FeAtures PrisM 4, No. 3 Williams 2008-2013–it has recently been increased by a further €175 million. ■■ Development funding also assists the wider Horn, with projects in Kenya (€98 million), Ethiopia (€130million), Eritrea (€70 million), and Djibouti (€1.5 million) in the same period. These are targeted at food security and rural development to ensure sustainable solutions for the population; ■■ Humanitarian aid of €158 million over the last year to assist in feeding up to 12 million people affected by the drought–the worst drought in 60 years according to the UN. This will provide food aid, healthcare, access to clean water, and sanitation; ■■ The support to the Rule of Law and Security, implemented by the UN Development Program, is developing the Somali judiciary system including civil police, improving access to justice, and training of custodial services; ■■ Security sector support–the EU has contributed over €200 million in direct support of AMISOM since 2007. With the Transitional Government of Somalia transformed into a fully legitimate Government following elections last year, with developments in the instruments of state bolstered by EU (€1.6 billion expended by the EU on the Horn of Africa between 2008 and 2013) and other partners’ funding, clear successes of AMISOM (augmented by credible Somali troops emerging out of the EUTM pipeline) against Al Shabab, with impressive reductions in rates of piracy offshore22 all supported by a more joined up approach at sea and on land, it is not unreasonable consider there is a growing body of evidence that the EU’s new approach Bundeswehr/Marc Tessensohn european training Mission in somaliaPrisM 4, No. 3 FeAtures | 57 A EuropEAn union MilitAry point of ViEw to Comprehensiveness is beginning to deliver.23 Albeit one must recognize that such success cannot be delivered through EU action alone. Real and lasting success is ultimately dependent on alignment of EU work strands with those of strategic and, most importantly, regional partners. Conclusion Winston Churchill once said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity, the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” Demonstrable advances highlighted above are grounds for real optimism. But optimism tinged with reality that there is no simple way forward. This article began with a simple hypothesis–as apples differ from pears, the military residing in different parts of Brussels are different fruit. One can’t simply equate military modus vivendi in the EU (apples) with other military dominated organizations, such as NATO (pears). The military within the EU is a junior partner but, nevertheless, is a key actor in the Comprehensive pursuit of truly enduring end-states. But in applying the EU’s hugely multi- faceted and uniquely integral Comprehensiveness, the military has to accept a strategic environment perpetually dominated by convoluted nexus of inter-related issues (both visible and invisible) that often result in unavoidable or unintended consequences. Accordingly the military must learn to operate in a context where dealing with ambivalence is an ever-present challenge to the military mind. Given the challenges of ambiguity and complexity, such realities necessitate persistent and wide-ranging engagement by the military in the EU to ensure, by close collaboration and deft compromise, the input of a clear security and defense perspective into EU business. Unsurprisingly this can, at times, be frustratingly slow! One should not forget, however, that even earlier conflict prevention initiatives benefit from the new EU Comprehensiveness in stemming the march of an increasing number of issues towards crisis; a substantial dividend of the complexity, diversity and reach of the EU’s many instruments that is often too easily overlooked. Rightly, protracted responses do not always sit easily with Member States who demand more immediate cost efficient outcomes. But here again there are grounds for optimism as such drive naturally resides in the genes of the military staff due to their frequent rotation.24 Consequently, if one focuses purely on the military in this complex (“wicked”) world of the EU, that component’s clearly understood end is to deliver such timely effect but through ways that have to fit the unique peculiarities of the EU. And do so, when compared with other security and defense related organizations, with military means that are lean by any standard. Notes 1 Systems engineers often refer to convoluted and complex interrelated problems as “Wicked Problems” – a term not referring to such problems being evil but more to situations which are manifestly hugely resistant to resolution. It is an environment in which unintended consequences flourish if one is not careful. 2 Contemporary and potential threats have been identified in the 2003 European Union Security Strategy–much has happened since. 3 External ambition is the context of this article but it should not be forgotten the Lisbon Treaty raised two clauses that will impact in ways yet to be decided by Member States: the Solidarity Clause (that focuses more on support for resolution of internal natural disasters) and the Mutual Assistance Clause (referring to internal manmade security issues–a legacy of the Western European Union (WEU) Treaty which is especially valid for European Member States who don’t belong to NATO). 4 The EEAS (that includes a network of EU Delegations around the world) assists the High Representative to deliver external action. Key policy goals are: a secure stable and prosperous European neighbourhood; closer relationships with strategic partners; universal respect for human rights; the spread of democracy and the rule of law; a sustainable development policy; crisis management and conflict prevention. Some examples action in pursuit of those goals are: Peace building: through political, practical and economic support the EU has played a crucial role in peace building in 58 | FeAtures PrisM 4, No. 3 Williams the Western Balkans after the Yugoslav wars. From BosniaHerzegovina to Montenegro, the EU has used its power to promote peace and reconciliation. The latest example of this is the dialogue being facilitated by the European Union between Serbia and Kosovo – the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. A responsible neighbour: to the East and South of the European Union lie many countries that have in recent years undergone tumultuous political change. The Arab Awakening is just the latest example of this. Which is why the European Neighbourhood Policy aims to maintain solid and friendly relations with countries that are at the European Union’s borders. Promoting democracy, human rights and opening trade and cooperation on visa issues are just some examples of this. Development Aid: which is making a huge difference to millions of people’s livelihoods around the world. The EU is member of the Quartet, alongside the United Nations, the United States and Russia, which is working for peace in the Middle East. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. The EU’s objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state side-by-side with Israel in peace and security. The Union is committed to human rights and works to ensure they are respected universally. The EU has made human rights a central aspect of its external relations: in the political dialogues it holds with third countries; through its development policy and assistance; or through its action in multilateral fora, such as the United Nations. The Union works closely with the United Nations on a host of issues. The Union’s belief in multilateralism reflects an attachment to negotiated, binding rules in international relations, and is explicitly spelled out in the Treaty of Lisbon. Building security around the world: Under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU operates civilian and military missions worldwide. These missions carry out a variety of tasks from border management to local police training. For example the Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia tackles piracy and protects humanitarian shipments of the World Food Program bound for drought hit areas. Crisis Response & Humanitarian Aid: Almost half of all international humanitarian relief comes from the European Union and its members. This provides life saving aid in places like the Horn of Africa where famine stalks whole populations. In addition the European Union stands ready to respond in a coordinated way to any international emergency–be it the earthquake in Haiti, tsunami in Japan or flooding in Pakistan. This brings together all the tools the European Union has at its disposal. The Union was instrumental in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and, with a domestic low-carbon agenda that is probably the most advanced and sophisticated in the world remains a crucial player on this issue, indispensable for pushing an ambitious agenda of change. The Union is focusing on building a coalition for a legally binding agreement on climate change. Trade: The European Union is the world’s largest trading bloc. Trade is a common policy so the EU speaks with a single voice in trade negotiations with international partners in promoting a free and fairer international trading system. 5 The EU Military Staff (EUMS) was transferred from the General Secretariat of the Council to the EEAS on 1 January 2011. The EUMS is the source of collective multidisciplinary military expertise within the EEAS; working under the direction of the EUMC and under the direct authority of the High Representative Vice President. As an integral component of the EEAS’s Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, with particular foci on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: provision of early warning (through the Single Intelligence Assessment Capability (SIAC)–a virtual organisation of military and civil intelligence), situation assessment, strategic planning, Communications and Information Systems (CIS), concept development and support of partnerships through mil-mil relationships. Concurrently the EUMS is charged with sustaining the dormant Ops Centre in Brussels and providing its core staff when activated. 6 The European Council was created in 1974 with the intention of establishing an informal forum for discussion between Heads of State or Government. It rapidly developed into the body that fixed goals for the Union and set the course for achieving them, in all fields of EU activity. It acquired a formal status in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which defined its function as providing the impetus and general political guidelines for the Union’s development. On 1 December 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it became one of the seven institutions of the Union. President of the European Council is currently is Herman Van Rompuy. 7 The Foreign Affairs Council is made up of European Union Member State Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development. These Ministers attend monthly meetings to discuss foreign policy, trade, security, defence and development matters. 8 The European Commission (EC) is the executive body of the European Union responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union’s treaties and day-to-day running of the EU. The Commission operates as a cabinet government, with 27 members of the Commission (informally known as commissioners). There is one member per member state, though members are bound to represent the interests of the EU as a whole rather than their home state. One of the 27 is the Commission President (currently José Manuel Barroso) proposed by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament.PrisM 4, No. 3 FeAtures | 59 A EuropEAn union MilitAry point of ViEw 9 The EU is the largest single donor of development aid–in 2010, the combined total of donations from the EU and member states was €53.8 billion 10 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), is a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU) and is the domain of EU policy covering defence and military aspects. Formally, the Common Security and Defence Policy is the domain of the European Council. CSDP structures and instruments are summarized at: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/cpcc?lang=en 11 Note earlier distinction between Comprehensive Action and Comprehensive Approach. Whereas NATO, to a great extent, has to contract-in capacities to deliver a comprehensive approach–and even then the construct will remain defence dominated. 12 For instance, within the Commission the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in pursuit of its humanitarian aid mandate needs to sustain its impartiality, whilst the EEAS, by dint of its Member States’ oversight and mandate, will be obligated to be partial in most crises. 13 Or in other words the archetypical “Wicked Problem”. 14 Principal levers of Parliament could be considered to be its influence over annual budget votes and political pressure on HRVP when she reports to Parliament. 15 CSDP Committees: EUMC (supported by the EUMC Working Group), Political Military Group (PMG) and Civil Committee (CIVCOM). 16 In a few cases MILREPS represent Ministers of Defence not CHODS; for instance Cyprus, Malta, Sweden. 17 With respect to NATO this interface is currently politically authorised to be at the staff to staff level only. 18 As an aside, with regard to the argument of the term lower versus softer end of the spectrum, empirical evidence points to ever increasing complexity and problem ‘Wickedness’ as one secures the peace. Softer often implies easier. In many cases, however, that implication could not be further from the truth of what is routinely experienced at the lower end of the spectrum. 19 Further reading at: http://www.eda.europa.eu 20 Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation- Europe Aid: Europe Aid Development and Cooperation is responsible for designing European development policy and delivering aid throughout the world. Europe Aid delivers aid through a set of financial instruments with a focus on ensuring the quality of EU aid and its effectiveness. An active and proactive player in the development field, it promotes good governance, human and economic development and tackle universal issues, such as fighting hunger and preserving natural resources. DG DEVCO, through the Europe Aid cooperation office, implements the funding instruments for external assistance. 21 The EU Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created in 1992 as an expression of the European solidarity with people in need all around the world. In its 20 year existence it has provided €14 billion of humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict and disasters in 140 countries around the globe. Over the last five years ECHO’s annual budget has averaged €1 billion. In 2011 alone these funds reached nearly 150 million of the world’s most vulnerable people in over 80 countries. 22 No ship has been pirated since May 2012. 5 Ships and 745 hostages held currently in January 2013 compares with 32 ships and 745 hostages in January 2011. That said there is no room for complacency with pirate disruptions by friendly forces (Op ATALANTA (EU), Op OCEAN SHIELD (NATO) and Coalition Maritime Forces) still continuing and noting increasing sophistication of the pirates that included on 15 December 2012 attacks by Somali pirates off Muscat in Oman (some 1200 nautical miles from Somalia). 23 Those first holistic steps have encouraged development of overarching strategies for other regions–the ‘Strategy for the Sahel’ is one such example with EUCAP Sahel (Niger)–delivering Security Sector Reform assistance in Niger–being the first practical CSDP output from that strategy. 24 All EUMS personnel are Seconded National Experts (SNE) on loan to the EEAS for 3-4 years, with basic pay provided by national resources and all subsistence, and all other job related expenses, provided by the EU.